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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Reynolds ("Ms. a 
Supreme Court on June 10, 2015, of a district court opinion order entered by 
Judge Jeff Brudie, in which the Magistrate's custody decision was affirmed, except for the 
limited issue of overnights the children had with the Appellant for the purpose of calculating 
child support. In this appeal, Ms. Reynolds raised the issues of whether the court had subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear the Respondent's, Jeffrey Keith Lunders ("Mr. Lunders"), Motion to 
Modify Child Custody and Child Support filed September 13, 2012, whether there had been 
material, permanent and substantial changes in circumstances to support a change in custody and 
whether the magistrate court committed a fundamental error by inferring language into the 
previous orders not otherwise stated. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Ms. Reynolds filed a Complaint for Legal Separation on July 19, 2011. Mr. Lunders filed 
an Answer and Counterclaim on August 15, 2011, in which Mr. Lunders counterclaimed for 
divorce. R. pg. 42. Although there was no written court order compelling it, the parties agreed to 
have Dr. Gallaher complete a psychological evaluation of each party. See Audio and Tr. at 
72. Mr. Lunders was found to have no clinical diagnosis. Tr. at 72-7 3. Ms. Reynolds was 
diagnosed as having "Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified." Tr. at 7 3-7 4, and the last 
paragraph of Page 18 a/Defendant's Exhibit 505 and 506. 
On June 28, 2012, a Stipulation for Entry of Order was entered, and on July 16, 2012, the 
Magistrate entered Orders Regarding Amending Complaint, Child Custody, Child Support and 
Spousal Maintenance, along with a Supplemental Order Regarding Parenting Responsibilities. 
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Stipulation recites in relevant part, "It is the parties' mtent to be presently bound to the 
terms proposed orders attached hereto. Stipulation at 1. correct 
inadvertent omission mistakes, Amended Orders Regarding Amending Complaint, 
Custody, Child Support and Spousal Maintenance were entered on July 19, 2012. R. pg 89-93. 
The amended order states, "Subject to any review provisions herein, this order is otherwise final 
with respect to the issues resolved hereby." R. pg. 92. Thus, the only substantive issues left 
regarding the divorce were the allocation of the marital assets and obligations. 
A trial on the remaining issues was set for September 11, 2012. See the Court's audio 
recording of September 11, 2012. The parties were divorced on September 11, 201 under the 
terms set forth on the record. Id. The Judge stated on the record that the July 19, 2012 order was 
not disturbed by settling the property issues. Id. 
Subsequently, on September 13, 2012, Mr. Lunders filed a Motion to Modify Child 
Custody and Support Order, seeking to modify the Amended Orders entered July 19, 2012. 
Motion to A1od(fy at 1. Ms. Reynolds filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Modify Child 
Custody on October 9, 2012. 
On December 20, 2012, the Court memorialized the verbal decree entered on the record 
by entering a Decree of Divorce nunc pro tune to September 11, 2012. In the findings section of 
the decree, it states, "However, the Defendant's Motion to Modify Child Custody and Support 
Order was not resolved by the September 11, 2012 hearing. The parties stipulated to such further 
terms that they have been able to agree upon since the aforementioned hearings." R. pg 98. 
Further, Paragraph IV of the decree states in part, "The terms of custody and child support were 
finalized in this Court's July 16, 2012 Orders Regarding Amending Complaint, Child Custody, 
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Child Support Spousal Maintenance and remain undisturbed by this 
error and should have ,.,,r-,,tpti to the amended 
on July 19, 2012, but nevertheless doesn't affect the and the court's 
court's order that the earlier custody order resolved and finalized the custody issues. 
The trial on Mr. Lunders' Motion to Modify was held on January 7, 8 and 9, 2014, with 
the parties submitting written closing arguments on January 17, 2014. On February 14, 2014, the 
Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. pg. 136-149. The Court entered an 
Amended Decree of Divorce on May 9, 2014. Ms. Reynolds filed a Notice of Appeal on May 21, 
2014, and a Motion to Reconsider Child Support on May 9, 2014. R. pg. 152-165. Ms. Reynolds' 
Motion to Reconsider Child Support was denied on June 26, 2014. 
Ms. Reynolds filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on June 4, 2014. The appeal was heard 
on December 18, 2014, in front of Honorable Judge Jeff M. Brudie and the District Court 
entered its Opinion and Order on Appeal on January 30, 2015. R. pg. 317-326. Ms. Reynolds 
filed a Petition for Rehearing on February 20,201 which was denied on April 30, 2015. 
Ms. Reynolds submitted a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on June l 0, 
2015, in which she appealed as to the issues of whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear Mr. Lunders' Motion to Modify, whether there had been substantial, material and 
permanent changes in circumstances to support a change in custody and whether the magistrate 
court committed a fundamental error by inferring language into the previous orders not 
othenvise stated. R. pg. 398-403. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Mr. Lunders are the parents 
2000, A.E.L 2005 and A.R.L. born 2012. After proceedings were initiated 
divorce in July 2011, the parties agreed that Dr. Gallaher would complete a psychological 
evaluation of both parties. The evaluations were completed in December of 2011, Tr. at 88. and 
Mr. Lunders was not found to have any clinical issues. Tr. at 72-73. Ms. Reynolds was found to 
have "Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified." Tr. at Dr. Gallaher concluded in 
part Ms. Reynolds, "may well not provide a consistent and stable emotional environment for the 
children when she is upset because she is likely to first think about her needs and wishes." Page 
19 Defendant's Exhibit No. 505 or 506. 
In the spring and summer of 2012, the parties were in negotiation as to child custody. The 
parties agreed that Ms. Reynolds would have primary custody; June 28, 2012 Stipulationfbr 
Entry of Order. Based on the results of Dr. Gallaher's evaluation and recommendation. the 
stipulated order entered on July 16, 2012, and amended orders entered on July 19, 201 required 
Ms. Reynolds to obtain a psychological evaluation and to follow all recommendations. R. pg 92. 
The language was written in such a way that Ms. Reynolds' evaluation and treatment would be 
largely a private matter. Id. Essentially, Ms. Reynolds was entrusted to get an honest second 
opinion and follow recommended treatment following the diagnosis of a personality disorder by 
Dr. Gallaher. 
Instead, Ms. Reynolds went to see Dr. Kwon and failed to disclose that she had been 
diagnosed with a personality disorder. See Tr. At 109-110. She presented herself to Dr. Kwon as 
a victim of domestic abuse at the hands of Mr. Lunders, Id., and Dr. Kwon recommended six 
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sessions of assertiveness training. At The course of treatment appears to 
201 Defendant's at 
stated Mr. Lunders was given notice of the treatment, but Mr. Lunders not 
personally know of Ms. Reynolds' completing assertiveness training, as opposed to getting 
treatment for a personality disorder, until well after the Court had entered the July 19, 2012 
custody order. Tr. 411, 441-446. Mr. Lunders testified that he did not know Ms. Reynolds' 
treatment status at the time he filed his modification motion. id. Mr. Lunders' testimony that he 
was not aware of Ms. Reynolds' assertiveness training prior to the entry of the Court's July 19, 
2012 amended custodial order is verified by the fact that Mr. Lunders did not mention his 
concern about Ms. Reynolds' course of treatment with Dr. Kwon in his modification motion. 
The July 19, 2012 amended custodial order disposed of other issues. First, that Ms. 
Reynolds was amending her complain of separation to a complaint for divorce. R. pg 89. It also 
resolved the issues of child support and spousal maintenance. R. pg 89-90. The parties stipulated 
that they intended to be presently bound by the order, and that the order was a final order as to 
the issues addressed. 
Shortly after the July 19, 2012 amended custodial order was entered, Mr. Lunders 
became aware of issues that caused him a great deal of concern about the well-being of his 
children. On September 6, 2012, Mr. Lunders verified his Motion to Modify Child Custody and 
Child Support Order, and it was filed on September 13, 2012. 
On September 11, 2012, between the dates that the motion was verified and filed, the 
parties had a hearing to resolve allocating the parties' marital assets and obligations between 
them. The parties stipulated to a final Decree of Divorce, and the Court verbally accepted the 
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stipulation as the Court's decision in the matter. See the Court's audio ,.,,,,.,.,, .. c,,n 
stipulation on record was 
not resolve Mr. Lunders' Motion to 
which was reflected in the court's December 20, 2012 Decree of Divorce. See the Court's audio 
recording of September 11, 2012 and R. pg. 98. 
After Mr. Lunders' modification motion was filed, Ms. Reynolds filed two (2) responses. 
The first was the Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Modify Child Custody and Child 
Support Order, which was filed on October 9, 2012. The response denied the pennanent, 
substantial and material change in circumstances since the entry of the Amended Orders on July 
19, 2012. Plaintiff's Response at 2. The second response was the Response to Rule 60(c) Motion 
to Modify, which was filed on February 6, 2013. In both responses, Ms. Reynolds denied the 
change in circumstances, but admitted that the court had jurisdiction of the matter and parties. 
Response to Rule 60(c) at 1. 
The parties stipulated to an Order for Custodial Evaluation on May 2, 2013, nunc pro 
Tune to March 22, 2013. A Brief Focus of Assessment written by Michelle Fitting, Custody 
Evaluator for the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho for the County of Nez Perce, on 
August 28, 2013 states, "Ronda needs to attend counseling with a professional that has 
knowledge base of treatment with personality disorders; borderline personality and paranoid 
personality disorders and follow all the treatment recommendations. This is not a short term 
treatment, and if the client is not engaged then the treatment is ineffective. I recommend Dr. 
Wilson as one option for treatment provider for Ronda." Defendant's Exhibit 545 at 18. Dr. 
Wilson prepared a Custodial Evaluation of January 2014, which recites, "Consistent with Ms. 
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detailed commentary associated with her Brief 
address problematic cognitions, affectivity and interpersonal functioning 
Defendant's Exhibit 541 at 119. 
term 
The trial on Mr. Lunders' Motion to Modify Child Custody and Child Support was held 
on January 7, 8 and 9, 2014, with the parties submitting written closing arguments on January 
17, 2014. On February 14, 2014, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The Court found, considering the testimony and the evaluations of the parties, that it is in the 
best interests of the children for Mr. Lunders to have primary physical custody of the children. R. 
pg. 144. An Amended Decree of Divorce was entered on May 9, 2014, taking into account the 
recommended custody schedule from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Ms. Reynolds filed a Notice of Appeal on May 21, 2014, and an Amended Notice of 
Appeal on June 4, 2014. Before filing her Amended Notice of Appeal, Ms. Reynolds filed a 
Motion to Reconsider Child Support on May 27, 2014, stating that the Amended Decree of 
Divorce did not reflect the correct number of overnights she had in 2014. The Motion was 
denied on June 12, 2014. 
Ms. Reynolds' appeal was heard on December 18, 2014, in front of Honorable Judge Jeff 
M. Brudie and the District Court entered its Opinion and Order on Appeal on January 30, 2015. 
The Court found that the court had jurisdiction to hear the Motion to Modify, R. pg 320, that the 
court properly considered the evidence and testimony from the entry of the July 19, 2012 
amended orders, R. pg 320, and the January 2014 trial in making its determination that there had 
been material, permanent and substantial changes in circumstances, that it was in the best 
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Reynolds to 
the court's order to treatment 
she had diagnosed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Issue One: Whether the Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mr. Lunders' 
Motion to Modify. 
Issue Two: Whether there were material, substantial and permanent changes in 
circumstances to support a change in custody . 
Issue Three: Did the Magistrate Court commit a fundamental error by adding a 
requirement to the previous order not otherwise stated? 
ST AND ARD OF REVIE\V 
The standard of review of a trial court's child custody determination is well settled. 
A trial court's child custody decision will not be overturned absent 
an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court does not abuse its 
discretion as long as the court "recognizes the issue as one of 
discretion, acts within the outer limits of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available 
choices, and reaches its decision through an exercise ofreason." 
Id When the trial court's decisions affect children, the best interest 
of the child is the primary consideration. Id. at 403-04, 64 P.3d at 
329-30. 
Suter v. Biggers, 157 Idaho 542,337 P. 3d 1271, 1275 (2014). 
Child custody determinations involving minor children are left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned 
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In reviewing such 
decisions, the relevant inquiry is whether the trial court (1) 
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correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; acted 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the choices before reached 
decision by an exercise of reason. It is the province of the trier 
fact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the 
credibility of witnesses. The trial court's findings of facts in a 
court tried case will be upheld if they are supported by substantial 
and competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, and 
will be liberally construed in favor of the judgment entered. 
Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 626 (2007) (internal citations omitted) 
[The Appellate court's role is to] determine whether substantial 
evidence exists and is precluded from substituting its judgment for 
that of fact finder as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight of 
testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence. [The appellate court does not] reweigh conflicting 
evidence or attempt to judge the credibility of witnesses on appeal. 
Schneider v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 415,424 (2006) (editorialized as shown with 
internal citations omitted) 
On the other hand, a trial court abuses its discretion when it makes 
a custody award based on evidence that is insufficient to conclude 
that the award is in the child's best interest. A magistrate's 
findings of fact, however, will be upheld if they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence and are not clearly erroneous. 
Evidence is substantial "if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it 
and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed pont of fact has 
been proven." When reviewing a magistrate's findings of fact, we 
view the evidence in favor of the magistrate's judgment and will 
uphold the magistrate's findings even if there is conflicting 
evidence. We will not make credibility determinations or replace 
the trial court's factual findings by reweighing the evidence. 
Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho at 929, 934 (2009) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS MATTER. 
1. The Amended Orders Regarding Amending Complaint, Child Custody, Child 
Support and Spousal Maintenance was a final order and therefore modifiable. 
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The Regarding Amending Complaint, Custody, 
on and 
Child Custody, Child Support and Spousal Maintenance entered on July 19,201 were deemed 
to be final orders with respect to the issues of amending Plaintiffs complaint, child custody, 
child support and spousal maintenance. R. pg. 92. Ms. Reynolds states in her brief that it is 
undisputed that the Decree of Divorce entered on December 20, 2012, was intended to be the 
final order resolving all issues in the case. While this is true, the Decree of the Divorce recites, 
"The terms of custody and child support were finalized in this Court's July 16, 2012 Orders 
Regarding Amending Complaint, Child Custody, Child Support and Spousal Maintenance and 
remain undisturbed by this Decree.'' R. pg. 99. The Decree referenced the Amended Orders 
entered on July 19, 2012, as the final order regarding child support and custody and those orders 
were incorporated in the Decree. 
By definition, an interlocutory order is an order that does not finally determine the rights, 
duties and obligations of the parties to the proceeding. The Amended Orders were intended to be 
the final custodial order before their entry on July 19, 2012. The Stipulation for Entry filed on 
June 28, 2012 recites in part, "It is the parties' intent to be presently bound to the terms of the 
final proposed orders attached hereto." Stipulation for Entry at I. The Amended Orders 
Regarding Amending Complaint, Child Custody, Child Support and Spousal Maintenance are 
not interlocutory orders because they are the final custody order, and they were entered before 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The Amended Orders state, "Subject to any review 
provisions herein, this order is otherwise final with respect to the issues resolved hereby." R. pg. 
92. 
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Furthermore, the Decree of Divorce entered on December 20, nunc pro to 
July 16, 2012 Orders Regarding Amending Complaint, Child Custody, Child Support and 
Spousal Maintenance and remain undisturbed by this Decree." R. pg. 99. This was a 
clerical/inadvertent error and should have recited to the amended custodial order entered on July 
19, 2012. 
In addition, on February 12, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court ordered that "any judgment, 
decree or order entered before April 15, 2015, that was intended to be final but which did not 
comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (a) or Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 803 
shall be treated as a final judgment." See www.isc.idaho.gov/links/Order-2-12-15.pdf 
Based on the intention of the parties reflected in the Stipulation for Entry, the Amended 
Orders, the language in the Decree of Divorce and the February 12, 2015 Order of the Idaho 
Supreme Court, the Amended Orders Amending Complaint, Child Custody, Child Support and 
Spousal Maintenance is a final order. The pleading is not an interlocutory· order, but a final 
order, and, therefore, modifiable. 
Ms. Reynolds attempts to cloud the jurisdiction issue by continually referencing the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce on December 20, 2012, and omitting nunc pro tune September 11, 
2012, and Ms. Reynolds also neglects to include the language in the Decree that this court 
adopted as its final order relating to said issues on July 16, 2012, in the Orders Regarding 
Amending Complaint, Child Custody, Child Support and Spousal Maintenance. R. pg. 98. 
2. Ms. Reynolds filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Modify Child Custody and 
Child Support on October 9, 2012 without claiming a defense of lack of jurisdiction. 
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Mr. Lunders filed a Motion to Modify Child Custody and Child on 
and 
Amended on July 9, 2012. In paragraph one (1) of 
that the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho for the County of Nez 
Perce had jurisdiction over the matter and both parties. Motion to ivfod[fy at 1. Ms. Reynolds 
filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Modify on October 9, 2012, in which she admitted 
this paragraph. Plaintiff's Response at 1. 
Ms. Reynolds obtained a new attorney, who drafted a second response which was the 
Response to Rule 60(c) Motion to Modify, that was filed on February 6, 2013. In both responses, 
Ms. Reynolds denied the change in circumstances, Response to Rule 60(c) at 1, but admitted that 
the court had jurisdiction of the matter and parties. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(g) 
states in relevant part, "A defense of lack of jurisdiction is waived unless it is made by motion 
prior to filing a responsive pleading and prior to filing any other motion, other than a motion for 
an extension of time to respond or otherwise appear." Due to Ms. Reynolds' filing a response to 
Mr. Lunders' Motion without objecting to the claim of the District Court of Nez Perce County 
having jurisdiction over the matter, she waived her opportunity to use this defense. 
II. THERE WERE MATERIAL, PERMANENT AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN TO 
MODIFY CUSTODY. 
1. The Court Determined There Had Been Material, Permanent and Substantial 
Changes in Circumstances. 
Ms. Reynolds argues Mr. Lunders' Motion to Modify Child Custody and Child Support 
is a re-litigation of the Amended Orders entered on July 19, 2012, and therefore should not have 
been considered by the Court. Ms. Reynolds argues that Mr. Lunders' filing of his Motion to 
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Child Custody and Support was "buyer's remorse·' and all of his 
to the the Decree of on 12. 
Mr. '-''-"''~._,,.., stipulated to the Decree Divorce nunc tune 
September 11, 2012, incorporating the child custody and support order entered on July 16, 201 
Mr. Lunders' Motion to Modify Child Custody and Child Support alleges multiple incidents 
concern occurring in July, August and early September 2012, after the stipulation of parties and 
entry of the custody order. Since Mr. Lunders' Motion to Modify Child Custody and Child 
Support was not heard until January 7, 8 and 9, 2014, there were multiple other incidents and 
accusations raised at trial, including that both parents had remarried. The material, substantial 
and permanent changes in circumstances are articulated in the February 14, 2014, Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law. R. pg. 140-144. 
Ms. Reynolds argues that other incidents noted by the February 2014 Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law occurred prior to entry of the July and December 2012 orders, were 
insufficient to show material, permanent and substantial changes in circumstances, and should 
not have been considered by the court. The Court rightfully considered Mr. Lunders' allegations 
in his Motion to Modify Child Custody and Child Support, as well as other incidents occurring 
between July 19, 2012, and the trial dates in January 2014. Ms. Reynolds gives no basis in the 
law for her arguments that allegations or incidents after the Decree of Divorce should be 
considered. 
Following Mr. Lunders' Motion to Modify Child Custody and Child Support and Ms. 
Reynolds' Response to Defendants Motion to Modify Child Custody and Child Support, and 
prior to trial, Dr. Gallaher completed an updated report on his earlier evaluation on August 
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as 
requested Reynolds, Dr. Wilson completed a -~u .. ~~ 
All of the experts' reports and testimony were 
the magistrate his decision. The trial on Mr. Lunders' Motion to Modify Child Custody and 
Support was not held until January 2014, nearly eighteen (18) months after entry of the custody 
order on July 16, 2012. 
In a family law case, Idaho law charges the Magistrate with assessing the credibility of 
witnesses, weighing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. See Schneider at 
424. The trial court's findings of fact in a court tried case will be upheld if they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, and will be liberally 
construed in favor of the judgment entered. Hopper v. Hopper. 144 Idaho 624, 626 (2007). Mr. 
Lunders argues that the finder of fact may apply his common sense, good judgment and general 
knowledge to make reasonable inferences. For persuasive authority, see Justice Bistline's dissent 
in Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185, 195 (Idaho 1991) and lvfcPheters v. 
Peterson, 108 Idaho 107, 110 (Idaho 1985). 
In its written findings, the court is clear that, taken on their face, the events and incidents 
would be insufficient to show material, permanent and substantial changes in circumstances. The 
court noted, however, that when the seemingly minor events were considered in combination 
with the testimony of the various experts, the events were indicators of the severity of Ms. 
Reynolds' personality disorder and its negative impact on the parties' children. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the anecdotal evidence within the context of the 
expert testimonial evidence and determine, based on the entirety of the evidence, that material, 
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permanent and substantial changes in circumstances had occurred since the trial court 
entered its 2 stipulated order. R. pg. 
Ms. Reynolds seems to be argumg that evidence speaking to the best interest 
children that arose prior to the Decree of Divorce entered on December 20, 2012, is irrelevant. 
This is clearly in opposition to the Idaho Supreme Court's instructions regarding what evidence 
is relevant, as well as, what constitutes a change in circumstances. Again, evidence of "an 
emerging pattern which is not apparent in the first consideration may come into focus at some 
later time," thus "the court should allow and consider all evidence relevant to a child's interest, 
not just that evidence which has emerged since the previous orders."Evans at 227. 
In its February 14, 2014 Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the trial court 
addressed the multiple factors contributing to a material, permanent and substantial change in 
circumstances and the impact of those changes on the best interests of the children. R. pg. 140-
144. The Court also notes that the materiality or substantial measure depends upon the impact of 
the change upon the child. Chislett, 120 Idaho at 298; 629 P.2d at 694. The trial court details its 
finding that it is in the best interests of the children under I. C. § 1 7 to modify custody. 
III. THE TRlAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT CONSCIOUSLY CHOSE TO A VOID COMPLYING WITH THE SPIRIT OF A 
CUSTODIAL ORDER. 
1. Ms. Reynolds Failed to Disclose Her Diagnosis of a Personality Disorder by Dr. 
Gallaher to Dr. Kwon, and Instead Received Treatment Based on Her Representation as a 
Victim of Domestic Abuse. 
In this case, the trial court found that there had been substantial, material and permanent 
changes in circumstances after the entry of the Amended Orders when Ms. Reynolds consciously 
chose to avoid complying with the spirit of the custodial order by failing to disclose the prior 
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diagnosis of a personality disorder to Dr. Kwon. The trial court, in its 
stated 
symptoms "Personality Disorder, NOS" accelerated his evaluation. JS 
aspect of this case. The experts are convincing and the Court sees this as at least a material and 
permanent change in circumstances in and of itself" R. pg. 143. The court found multiple factors 
which it articulated in its Findings of Facts of Conclusions of Law that contributed to its findings 
of material, permanent and substantial changes. 
After listening to testimony and reviewing reports, the Magistrate, through an exercise of 
reason, found that the evidence supported the inference that Ms. Reynolds violated the spirit of 
said order. The order was entered after Dr. Gallaher' s evaluation and recommendation for 
treatment of Ms. Reynolds. Ms. Reynolds attempted to get the Court to believe that she had 
disclosed to Dr. Kwon that Dr. Gallaher had diagnosed her with a personality disorder. Clearly, 
the Court did not find her testimony credible. Dr. Wilson testified that it appeared in Dr. Kwon's 
records that she essentially portrayed herself as a victim in an abusive marriage. 
The Magistrate was well within the bounds of his discretion to apply his common sense 
and good judgment to conflicting evidence before him. Experience and common sense dictates 
that it is highly unlikely that a licensed healthcare professional would fail to record the patient's 
stated reason for seeking healthcare. Also, that it is highly unlikely that if a patient disclosed a 
diagnosis from another provider, that the healthcare provider would not make a record of the 
disclosed diagnosis. According to Dr. Wilson's testimony, he acquired Dr. Kwon's records as 
part of his custodial evaluation, and it appeared in the records that Dr. Wilson received from Dr. 
Kwon that Ms. Reynolds merely disclosed that she was a victim of abuse. See Tr. at 109-110. 
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The Court concluded that when Ms. Reynolds sought "treatment not on 
finding of a personality disorder, but 
on representations to the treatment provider an abused victim" was avoidance. 
This is a case where Ms. Reynolds' violation of the spirit of the agreement/order by initially 
avoiding Dr. Gallaher's diagnosis, showed her character and circumstances and ability to parent 
in a negative light and as such is relevant in a child custody case. Ms. Reynolds' avoidance in 
pursuing treatment relevant to Dr. Gallaher's diagnosis of a personality disorder was also 
relevant as to her impaired parenting. 
In light of the fact that, according to Mr. Lunders, the parties negotiations which led to 
the agreement/order were based upon Dr. Gallaher's recommendations, Tr. at ./.JO, Ms. Reynolds 
failure to disclose Dr. Gallaher's diagnosis supports the Magistrate's finding that Ms. Reynolds 
"consciously chose to avoid complying with the spirit of that agreement/order by seeking 
treatment for an entirely different situation." Moreover, since Dr. Gallaher's report indicated that 
Ms. Reynolds' ability to parent may be negatively impacted by her condition, her failure to 
disclose the diagnosis was egregious as a parent. Therefore, Ms. Reynolds' avoidance of Dr. 
Gallaher' s diagnosis, avoidance of meaningful treatment, violation of the spirit of the 
agreement/order, and an irrational narrow focus on the language in the order was ongoing and 
relevant to her character and circumstances. See J.C. §32-717(/)(e). 
The finding is relevant to the Magistrate's decision not because there was a strict 
violation of the terms, but, in part at least, because it reflected the concern that Ms. Reynolds 
was avoiding the type of treatment that Dr. Gallaher and Dr. Wilson believed Ms. Reynolds 
needed and would help her to parent the children. The Magistrate was well within his discretion 
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to make the finding and rely upon it as part of his overall Idaho Code § 1 7 
Michelle Gallaher and Dr. Wilson all at 
Reynolds' 
This is clear when considering the full context of the Magistrate's words: 
In the case at hand, the stipulated Decree provided Ms. 
Reynolds would have a psychological exam and seek treatment 
based on that exam. The Court finds Ms. Reynolds consciously 
chose to avoid complying with the spirit of that agreement/order 
by seeking treatment for an entirely different situation. She sought 
treatment not based on the psychological finding of personal[ity] 
disorder, but rather got six (6) sessions of assertiveness training 
based on her representations to the treatment provider of being an 
abused victim. Also, the evaluator, Richard Gallaher, testified that 
he felt her symptoms of "Personality Disorder, NOS" accelerated 
after his evaluation. This is very troubling aspect of this case. The 
experts are convincing and the Court sees this as at least a material 
and permanent change in circumstances in and of itself. 
There are, however, other factors contributing to a material 
and permanent change of circumstances. The older boy has, by all 
accounts, become more strident regarding his desire to reside 
primarily with his father and both parties have remarried. Without 
going into each and every incident, the picture painted by the 
testimony shows a psychiatric disorder becoming worse with 
disturbing symptoms worsening resulting in an unhealthy 
environment for the minor children of the parties. The Court finds 
the testimony of Mr. Lunders regarding the various "incidents" 
testified to, much more credible than Ms. Reynolds' version. The 
incidents involving prescription drugs, the Tri-State Hospital 
incident, the Colorado travel incident and most troubling the 
ongoing insistence of there being sexual abuse by or condoned by 
the father, are all extremely troubling. The Court finds these show 
a pattern of behavior consistent with a personality disorder and 
unhealthy for the minor children 
This finding is buttressed by the opinion of all three (3) 
experts/professionals who testified in this case. 
to 
R. pg. 143. Clearly, the thrust of the Magistrate's point here was that there was an overall 
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acceleration of manifestations of Ms. Reynolds' "symptoms" which demonstrated a 
mmor that the to that a 
substantial, material and permanent change that it was now 
interests of the children for Mr. Lunders to have primary custody. 
The best interest of the child must take precedence in any analysis regarding a material 
change in circumstances. Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223,227 (2011) (internal citations omitted). 
Evidence of"an emerging pattern which is not apparent in the first consideration may come into 
focus at some later time," thus "the court should allow and consider all evidence relevant to a 
child's interest, not just that evidence which has emerged since previous orders." Id. (Emphasis 
added). 
Thus, it would be error to answer whether or not a substantial and material change in 
circumstances has occurred without taking into consideration all evidence that goes to what is 
now in the best interests of the children. There is no cut off date to relevance. 
While the material, permanent and substantial change standard is a sound 
legal principle, care must be exercised in its application. The tendency is 
to search for some greatly altered circumstance in an attempt to pinpoint 
the change called for by the rule. Thus, the emphasis is placed on defining 
some change, and making that change appear, in itself, to be material, 
permanent and substantial. This focus is misleading. The important 
portion of the standard is that which relates the change in conditions to the 
best interest of the child. The changed circumstances standard was 
designed, as a matter of policv, to prevent continuous re-litigation of 
custody matters. That policy goal, however, is of secondary importance 
when compared to the best interest of the child. which is the controlling 
consideration in all custody proceedings. The court must look not only for 
changes in condition or circumstance which are material, permanent and 
substantial, but also must thoroughly explore the ramifications, vis-a-vis 
the best interest of the child, of any change which is evident. What may 
appear by itself to be a small and insignificant change in circumstances 
may have significant effects insofar as children are concerned. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 22 
at 226 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added) 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Ms. appeal was made frivolously, and not 
or existing law. Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides for attorney fees and costs to be awarded when an 
action was brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. Jensen v. Jensen, 128 
Idaho 600, 917 P.2d 757 (1996). The purpose ofldaho Code§ 12-121 is to serve as a deterrent to 
groundless action to provide remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified burdens 
defending against groundless charges. Bogner v. State Department ofRevenue and Taxation, 
State Tax Com 'n, I 07 Idaho 854, 693 P.2d 1056 (1984). 
Thus, attorney fees and costs should be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code§ 1 121 and 
12-123, Rule l l(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
CONCLUSION 
In this appeal, Ms. Reynolds again frivolously argues that the district court and the trial 
court did not have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Lunders' Motion to Modify Child Custody and Child 
Support. As noted in the Opinion and Order on Appeal entered January 30, 2015, Ms. Reynolds' 
contention is contrary to Idaho Law, R. pg. 322. 
Prior to the stipulated custody order entered July 19, 2012, Ms. Reynolds had been 
diagnosed with a personality disorder. The trial court found the evidence, including reports and 
testimony of experts, compelling that Ms. Reynolds consciously failed to comply with the spirit 
of the court's order regarding counseling. Tr. pp 109-110. The Court properly considered 
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incidents from the July 19, 2012 orders until the January 14 and found that 
created an unhealthy 
Ms. Reynolds' Brief blatantly ignores both the District Court's and the 
Court's actual Findings of Facts and articulation of the material, permanent and substantial 
changes in circumstances and the impact on the best interests of the children. 
The Amended Decree of Divorce entered May 9, 2014, should be affirmed. 
DATED this 301h day of December, 2015. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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